In everyday life, many people believe that two heads are better than one. Our ability to solve problems together appears to be fundamental to the current dominance and future survival of the human species. But are two heads really better than one? We addressed this question in the context of a collective low-level perceptual decision-making task. For two observers of nearly equal visual sensitivity, two heads were definitely better than one, provided they were given the opportunity to communicate freely, even in the absence of any feedback about decision outcomes. But for observers with very different visual sensitivities, two heads were actually worse than the better one. These seemingly discrepant patterns of group behavior can be explained by a model in which two heads are Bayes optimal under the assumption that individuals accurately communicate their level of confidence on every trial.

Collective rituals are present in all known societies, but their function is a matter of long-standing debates. Field observations suggest that they may enhance social cohesion and that their effects are not limited to those actively performing but affect the audience as well. Here we show physiological effects of synchronized arousal in a Spanish fire-walking ritual, between active participants and related spectators, but not participants and other members of the audience. We assessed arousal by heart rate dynamics and applied nonlinear mathematical analysis to heart rate data obtained from 38 participants. We compared synchronized arousal between fire-walkers and spectators. For this comparison, we used recurrence quantification analysis on individual data and cross-recurrence quantification analysis on pairs of participants' data. These methods identified fine-grained commonalities of arousal during the 30-min ritual between firewalkers and related spectators but not unrelated spectators. This indicates that the mediating mechanism may be informational, because participants and related observers had very different bodily behavior. This study demonstrates that a collective ritual may evoke synchronized arousal over time between active participants and bystanders. It links field observations to a physiological basis and offers a unique approach for the quantification of social effects on human physiology during real-world interactions.social interaction | mirroring | recurrence plots | collective effervescence | social anthropology

The "intentional stance" is the disposition to treat an entity as a rational agent, possessing particular beliefs, desires, and intentions, in order to interpret and predict it's behavior. The intentional stance is a component of a broader social cognitive function, mentalizing. Here we report a study that investigates the neural substrates of "on-line" mentalizing, using PET, by asking volunteers to second-guess an opponent. In order to identify brain activity specifically associated with adoption of an intentional stance, we used a paradigm that allowed tight control of other cognitive demands. Volunteers played a computerised version of the children's game "stone, paper, scissors." In the mentalizing condition volunteers believed they were playing against the experimenter. In the comparison condition, volunteers believed they were playing against a computer. In fact, during the actual scanning, the "opponent" produced a random sequence in both conditions. The only difference was the attitude, or stance, adopted by the volunteer. Only one region was more active when volunteers adopted the intentional stance. This was in anterior paracingulate cortex (bilaterally). This region has been activated in a number of previous studies involving mentalizing. However, this is the first study suggesting a specific link between activity in this brain region and the adoption of an intentional stance.

a b s t r a c tBinocular rivalry occurs when the eyes are presented with different stimuli and subjective perception alternates between them. Though recent years have seen a number of models of this phenomenon, the mechanisms behind binocular rivalry are still debated and we still lack a principled understanding of why a cognitive system such as the brain should exhibit this striking kind of behaviour. Furthermore, psychophysical and neurophysiological (single cell and imaging) studies of rivalry are not unequivocal and have proven difficult to reconcile within one framework. This review takes an epistemological approach to rivalry that considers the brain as engaged in probabilistic unconscious perceptual inference about the causes of its sensory input. We describe a simple empirical Bayesian framework, implemented with predictive coding, which seems capable of explaining binocular rivalry and reconciling many findings. The core of the explanation is that selection of one stimulus, and subsequent alternation between stimuli in rivalry occur when: (i) there is no single model or hypothesis about the causes in the environment that enjoys both high likelihood and high prior probability and (ii) when one stimulus dominates, the bottom-up, driving signal for that stimulus is explained away while, crucially, the bottom-up signal for the suppressed stimulus is not, and remains as an unexplained but explainable prediction error signal. This induces instability in perceptual dynamics that can give rise to perceptual transitions or alternations during rivalry.

To study the mechanisms of coordination that are fundamental to successful interactions we carried out a joint finger tapping experiment in which pairs of participants were asked to maintain a given beat while synchronizing to an auditory signal coming from the other person or the computer. When both were hearing each other, the pair became a coupled, mutually and continuously adaptive unit of two "hyper-followers", with their intertap intervals (ITIs) oscillating in opposite directions on a tap-to-tap basis. There was thus no evidence for the emergence of a leader-follower strategy. We also found that dyads were equally good at synchronizing with the irregular, but responsive other as with the predictable, unresponsive computer. However, they performed worse when the "other" was both irregular and unresponsive. We thus propose that interpersonal coordination is facilitated by the mutual abilities to (a) predict the other's subsequent action and (b) adapt accordingly on a millisecond timescale.

SummaryThe opinions of others can easily affect how much we value things. We investigated what happens in our brain when we agree with others about the value of an object and whether or not there is evidence, at the neural level, for social conformity through which we change object valuation. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging we independently modeled (1) learning reviewer opinions about a piece of music, (2) reward value while receiving a token for that music, and (3) their interaction in 28 healthy adults. We show that agreement with two “expert” reviewers on music choice produces activity in a region of ventral striatum that also responds when receiving a valued object. It is known that the magnitude of activity in the ventral striatum reflects the value of reward-predicting stimuli [1–8]. We show that social influence on the value of an object is associated with the magnitude of the ventral striatum response to receiving it. This finding provides clear evidence that social influence mediates very basic value signals in known reinforcement learning circuitry [9–12]. Influence at such a low level could contribute to rapid learning and the swift spread of values throughout a population.

Mindfulness meditation is a set of attention-based, regulatory and self-inquiry training regimes. Although the impact of mindfulness meditation training (MT) on self-regulation is well established, the neural mechanisms supporting such plasticity are poorly understood. MT is thought to act on attention through interoceptive salience and attentional control mechanisms, but until now conflicting evidence from behavioral and neural measures has made it difficult to distinguish the role of these mechanisms. To resolve this question we conducted a fully randomized 6-week longitudinal trial of MT, explicitly controlling for cognitive and treatment effects with an active control group. We measured behavioral metacognition and whole-brain Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) signals using functional MRI during an affective Stroop task before and after intervention. Although both groups improved significantly on a response-inhibition task, only the MT group showed reduced affective Stroop conflict. Moreover, the MT group displayed greater dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) responses during executive processing, consistent with increased recruitment of top-down mechanisms to resolve conflict. In contrast, we did not observe overall group by time interactions on negative affect-related RTs or BOLD responses. However, only participants with the greatest amount of MT practice showed improvements in response-inhibition and increased recruitment of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and right anterior insula during negative valence processing. Collectively our findings highlight the importance of active control in MT research, and indicate unique neural mechanisms for progressive stages of mindfulness training.

Measuring brain activity simultaneously from two people interacting is intuitively appealing if one is interested in putative neural markers of social interaction. However, given the complex nature of interactions, it has proven difficult to carry out two-person brain imaging experiments in a methodologically feasible and conceptually relevant way. Only a small number of recent studies have put this into practice, using fMRI, EEG, or NIRS. Here, we review two main two-brain methodological approaches, each with two conceptual strategies. The first group has employed two-brain fMRI recordings, studying (1) turn-based interactions on the order of seconds, or (2) pseudo-interactive scenarios, where only one person is scanned at a time, investigating the flow of information between brains. The second group of studies has recorded dual EEG/NIRS from two people interacting, in (1) face-to-face turn-based interactions, investigating functional connectivity between theory-of-mind regions of interacting partners, or in (2) continuous mutual interactions on millisecond timescales, to measure coupling between the activity in one person's brain and the activity in the other's brain. We discuss the questions these approaches have addressed, and consider scenarios when simultaneous two-brain recordings are needed. Furthermore, we suggest that (1) quantification of inter-personal neural effects via measures of emergence, and (2) multivariate decoding models that generalize source-specific features of interaction, may provide novel tools to study brains in interaction. This may allow for a better understanding of social cognition as both representation and participation.