We assessed the relation between hemodynamic and electrical indices of brain function by performing simultaneous functional MRI (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) in awake subjects at rest with eyes closed. Spontaneous power fluctuations of electrical rhythms were determined for multiple discrete frequency bands, and associated fMRI signal modulations were mapped on a voxelby-voxel basis. There was little positive correlation of localized brain activity with alpha power (8 -12 Hz), but strong and widespread negative correlation in lateral frontal and parietal cortices that are known to support attentional processes. Power in a 17-23 Hz range of beta activity was positively correlated with activity in retrosplenial, temporo-parietal, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices. This set of areas has previously been characterized by high but coupled metabolism and blood flow at rest that decrease whenever subjects engage in explicit perception or action. The distributed patterns of fMRI activity that were correlated with power in different EEG bands overlapped strongly with those of functional connectivity, i.e., intrinsic covariations of regional activity at rest. This result indicates that, during resting wakefulness, and hence the absence of a task, these areas constitute separable and dynamic functional networks, and that activity in these networks is associated with distinct EEG signatures. Taken together with studies that have explicitly characterized the response properties of these distributed cortical systems, our findings may suggest that alpha oscillations signal a neural baseline with ''inattention'' whereas beta rhythms index spontaneous cognitive operations during conscious rest.electroencephalography ͉ human brain ͉ spontaneous activity ͉ functional magnetic resonance imaging ͉ blood oxygenation-leveldependent contrast

Fueled by developments in computational neuroscience, there has been increasing interest in the underlying neuro-computational mechanisms of psychosis. One successful approach involves predictive coding and Bayesian inference. Here, inferences regarding the current state of the world are made by combining prior beliefs with incoming sensory signals. Mismatches between prior beliefs and incoming signals constitute prediction errors that drive new learning. Psychosis has been suggested to result from a decreased precision in the encoding of prior beliefs relative to the sensory data, thereby garnering maladaptive inferences. Here, we review the current evidence for aberrant predictive coding and discuss challenges for this canonical predictive coding account of psychosis. For example, hallucinations and delusions may relate to distinct alterations in predictive coding, despite their common co-occurrence. More broadly, some studies implicate weakened prior beliefs in psychosis, and others find stronger priors. These challenges might be answered with a more nuanced view of predictive coding. Different priors may be specified for different sensory modalities and their integration, and deficits in each modality need not be uniform. Furthermore, hierarchical organization may be critical. Altered processes at lower levels of a hierarchy need not be linearly related to processes at higher levels (and vice versa). Finally, canonical theories do not highlight active inference – the process through which the effects of our actions on our sensations are anticipated and minimized. It is possible that conflicting findings might be reconciled by considering these complexities, portending a framework for psychosis more equipped to deal with its many manifestations.

The triple-code theory of numerical processing postulates an abstract-semantic "number sense." Neuropsychology points to intraparietal cortex as a potential substrate, but previous functional neuroimaging studies did not dissociate the representation of numerical magnitude from task-driven effects on intraparietal activation. In an event-related fMRI study, we presented numbers, letters, and colors in the visual and auditory modality, asking subjects to respond to target items within each category. In the absence of explicit magnitude processing, numbers compared with letters and colors across modalities activated a bilateral region in the horizontal intraparietal sulcus. This stimulus-driven number-specific intraparietal response supports the idea of a supramodal number representation that is automatically accessed by presentation of numbers and may code magnitude information.

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Until recently, it has been thought that under interocular suppression high-level visual processing is strongly inhibited if not abolished. With the development of continuous flash suppression (CFS), a variant of binocular rivalry, this notion has now been challenged by a number of reports showing that even high-level aspects of visual stimuli, such as familiarity, affect the time stimuli need to overcome CFS and emerge into awareness. In this “breaking continuous flash suppression” (b-CFS) paradigm, differential unconscious processing during suppression is inferred when (a) speeded detection responses to initially invisible stimuli differ, and (b) no comparable differences are found in non-rivalrous control conditions supposed to measure non-specific threshold differences between stimuli. The aim of the present study was to critically evaluate these assumptions. In six experiments we compared the detection of upright and inverted faces. We found that not only under CFS, but also in control conditions upright faces were detected faster and more accurately than inverted faces, although the effect was larger during CFS. However, reaction time (RT) distributions indicated critical differences between the CFS and the control condition. When RT distributions were matched, similar effect sizes were obtained in both conditions. Moreover, subjective ratings revealed that CFS and control conditions are not perceptually comparable. These findings cast doubt on the usefulness of non-rivalrous control conditions to rule out non-specific threshold differences as a cause of shorter detection latencies during CFS. Thus, at least in its present form, the b-CFS paradigm cannot provide unequivocal evidence for unconscious processing under interocular suppression. Nevertheless, our findings also demonstrate that the b-CFS paradigm can be fruitfully applied as a highly sensitive device to probe differences between stimuli in their potency to gain access to awareness.

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