Many people enjoy eating meat but dislike causing pain to animals. Dissociating meat from its animal origins may be a powerful way to avoid cognitive dissonance resulting from this 'meat paradox'. Here, we provide the first comprehensive test of this hypothesis, highlighting underlying psychological mechanisms. Processed meat made participants less empathetic towards the slaughtered animal than unprocessed meat (Study 1). When beheaded, a whole roasted pork evoked less empathy (Study 2a) and disgust (Study 2b) than when the head was present. These affective responses, in turn, made participants more willing to eat the roast and less willing to consider an alternative vegetarian dish. Conversely, presenting a living animal in a meat advertisement increased empathy and reduced willingness to eat meat (Study 3). Next, describing industrial meat production as "harvesting" versus "killing" or "slaughtering" indirectly reduced empathy (Study 4). Last, replacing "beef/pork" with "cow/pig" in a restaurant menu increased empathy and disgust, which both equally reduced willingness to eat meat and increased willingness to choose an alternative vegetarian dish (Study 5). In all experiments, effects were strongly mediated by dissociation and interacted with participants' general dissociation tendencies in Study 3 and 5, so that effects were particularly pronounced among participants who generally spend efforts disassociating meat from animals in their daily lives. Together, this line of research demonstrates the large role various culturally-entrenched processes of dissociation play for meat consumption.

Statistical information such as death risk estimates is frequently used for illustrating the magnitude of a problem. Such mortality statistics are however easier to evaluate if presented next to an earlier estimate, as the two data points together will illustrate an upward or downward change. How are people influenced by such changes? In seven experiments, participants read mortality statistics (e.g., number of yearly deaths or expert‐estimated death risks) made at two points of time about various cancer types. Each cancer type was manipulated to have either a downward trajectory (e.g., the estimated death risk was 37% in 2012, and was adjusted downward to 22% in 2014), an upward trajectory (e.g., 7% → 22%), or a flat trajectory (e.g., 22% → 22%). For each cancer type, participants estimated future mortality statistics and rated the perceived severity. They also allocated real money between projects aimed at preventing the different cancer types. Participants’ responses indicated that they thought that a trend made out of two data points would continue in the future. People also perceived cancer types with similar present mortality statistics as more severe and allocated more money to them when they had an upward trajectory compared to a flat or downward trajectory. Although there are boundary conditions, we conclude that people's severity ratings and helping behavior can be influenced by trend information even when such information is based on only two data points.

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Past research has revealed a trend effect when people are faced with a revised probabilistic forecast: A forecasted event that has become more (vs. less) certain is taken to signal a trend towards even stronger (weaker) certainty in future revisions of the forecast. The present paper expands this finding by exploring the boundary conditions of the trend effect and how it affects judgments of the forecaster. In Study 1, the trend effect was shown to persist when receivers process the forecast more deliberately, by considering reasons for the revision. In Study 2, trend continuation was predicted even when the two forecasts were made by different experts at different points in time. Study 3 demonstrated that the effect disappears when receivers are given an earlier forecast disrupting the linearity of the trend (e.g., a 60%-70% sequence preceded by a 70% forecast). In Study 4, two forecasters were perceived as more in agreement when revising divergent probabilities in the same rather than in opposite directions. If the event occurs, a forecast with downgraded probability (e.g. from 50% to 40%) was judged to be less accurate than an equally uncertain single forecast (40%).These results demonstrate the robustness of the trend effect based on two forecasts, affecting not only receivers' expectations of what comes next, but also their perceptions of the forecaster and of forecast accuracy. The findings have implications for how people communicate and understand risks and other uncertain events in areas such as climate science, weather prediction, political science and medicine.

Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a climate forecast can describe La Niña as having "more than 70% chance" or "less than 90% chance" of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate-related forecasts expressed with lower-bound ("over X% chance") or upper-bound ("under Y% chance") probability statements. Results indicate that such single-bound statements give pragmatic information in addition to the numeric probabilities they convey. First, the studies show that these statements are directional, leading the listeners' attention in opposite directions. "Over" statements guide attention towards the possible occurrence of the event and are explained by reasons for why it might happen, while "under" statements direct attention to its possible non-occurrence and are more often explained by reasons for why the target event might not appear, corresponding to positive (it is possible) versus negative (it is uncertain) verbal probabilities. Second, boundaries were found to reveal the forecaster's beliefs and could be perceived as indicative of an increasing or a decreasing trend. Single-bound probability estimates are therefore not neutral communications of probability level but might "leak" information about the speaker's expectations and about past and future developments of the forecast.

People often make predictions about the future based on trends they have observed in the past. Revised probabilistic forecasts can be perceived by the public as indicative of such a trend. In five studies, we describe experts who make probabilistic forecasts of various natural events (effects of climate changes, landslide and earthquake risks) at two points in time. Prognoses that have been upgraded or downgraded from T1 to T2 were in all studies expected to be updated further, in the same direction, later on (at T3). Thus, two prognoses were in these studies enough to define a trend, forming the basis for future projections. This “trend effect” implies that non-experts interpret recent forecast in light of what the expert said in the past, and think, for instance, that a “moderate” landslide risk will cause more worry if it has previously been low than if it has been high. By transcending the experts’ most recent forecasts the receivers are far from conservative, and appear to know more about the experts’ next prognoses than the experts themselves.

Climate projections and other predictions are often described as outcomes that can happen, indicating possibilities that are imaginable, but uncertain. Whereas the meanings of other uncertainty terms have been extensively studied, the uses of modal verbs like can and will have rarely been examined. Participants in five experiments were shown graphs and verbal statements showing projections of future global warming, sea level rise, and other climate-related issues. All studies gave support for the extremity hypothesis, which states that people use can-statements to describe the topmost values in a distribution of outcomes, regardless of their actual probabilities. Despite their extremity, outcomes that can happen are believed to have a substantial likelihood of occurrence. The extremity effect was replicated in 2 languages (Norwegian and English), and with several related terms (can, possible, could, and may). The combination of extremity and exaggerated likelihood conveyed by such statements could lead to serious miscommunications. (PsycINFO Database Record

Although daily meat consumption is a widespread habit, many individuals at the same time put a high value on the welfare of animals. While different psychological mechanisms have been identified to resolve this cognitive tension, such as dissociating the animal from the consumed meat or denying the animal’s moral status, few studies have investigated the effects of the animal’s appearance on the willingness to consume its meat. The present article explored how the perception of cuteness influences hypothetical meat consumption. We hypothesized that cuter animals would reduce the willingness to consume meat, and that this relationship would be mediated by empathy felt towards the animal. Across four pre-registered studies sampling 1074 US and Norwegian participants, we obtained some support for this prediction in the US but to a lesser degree in Norway. However, in all studies an indirect mediation effect of cuteness on meat consumption going through empathy towards the animal was observed. We also explored possible moderating and additional mediating mechanisms of trait pro-social orientation, caretaking intentions and sex effects for which we found mixed evidence. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.