The present research examines the nature of the different processes that have been proposed to underlie semantic priming. Specifically, it has been argued that priming arises as a result of automatic target activation and/or the use of strategies like prospective expectancy generation and retrospective semantic matching. This article investigates the extent that these processes rely on cognitive resources by experimentally manipulating working memory load. To disentangle prospective and retrospective processes, prime-target pairs were selected such that they were symmetrically associated (e.g., answer-question; SYM) or asymmetrically associated in either the forward direction (e.g., panda-bear; FA) or the backward direction (e.g., ball-catch; BA). The results showed that priming for FA pairs completely evaporated under a high working memory load but that it remained stable for BA and SYM pairs. This was taken to mean that prospective processes, which are assumed to cause FA priming, require cognitive resources, whereas retrospective processes, which lead to BA priming, are relatively effortless.

Continuous flash suppression (CFS) has been used as a paradigm to probe the extent to which word stimuli are processed in the absence of awareness. In the two experiments reported here, no evidence is obtained that word stimuli are processed up to the semantic level when suppressed through CFS. In Experiment 1, word stimuli did not break suppression faster than their pseudo-word variants nor was suppression time modulated by word frequency. Experiment 2 replicated these findings, but more critically showed that differential effects can be obtained with this paradigm using a simpler stimulus. In addition, pixel density of the stimuli did prove to be related to suppression time in both experiments, indicating that the paradigm is sensitive to differences in detectability. A third and final experiment replicated the well-known face inversion effect using the same set-up as Experiments 1 and 2, thereby demonstrating that the employed methodology can capture more high-level effects as well. These results are discussed in the context of previous evidence on unconscious semantic processing and two potential explanations are advanced. Specifically, it is argued that CFS might act at a level too low in the visual system for high-level effects to be observed or that the widely used breaking CFS paradigm is merely ill-suited to capture effects in the context of words.

Science is often perceived to be a self-correcting enterprise. In principle, the assessment of scientific claims is supposed to proceed in a cumulative fashion, with the reigning theories of the day progressively approximating truth more accurately over time. In practice, however, cumulative self-correction tends to proceed less efficiently than one might naively suppose. Far from evaluating new evidence dispassionately and infallibly, individual scientists often cling stubbornly to prior findings. Here we explore the dynamics of scientific self-correction at an individual rather than collective level. In 13 written statements, researchers from diverse branches of psychology share why and how they have lost confidence in one of their own published findings. We qualitatively characterize these disclosures and explore their implications. A cross-disciplinary survey suggests that such loss-of-confidence sentiments are surprisingly common among members of the broader scientific population yet rarely become part of the public record. We argue that removing barriers to self-correction at the individual level is imperative if the scientific community as a whole is to achieve the ideal of efficient self-correction.

The present study investigated people’s understanding of underinformative sentences like ‘Some oaks are trees’. Specifically, the scalar term ‘some’ can be interpreted pragmatically, Not all oaks are trees, or logically, some and possibly all oaks are trees. The aim of this study was to capture the interindividual variability in the interpretation of such sentences. In two experiments, participants provided truth value judgments for 20 underinformative sentences on which a latent class analysis was performed. The results revealed three latent classes: a consistent pragmatic group, a consistent logical group and an inconsistent group. Furthermore, we examined whether this interindividual variability could be explained by text characteristics, response times, cognitive abilities and personality traits. The results showed that only participants’ response times to the underinformative sentences could predict class membership. Specifically, the slower participants responded, the more likely they were to interpret underinformative sentences consistently pragmatic or inconsistent instead of consistently logical.

Science is often perceived to be a self-correcting enterprise. In principle, the assessment of scientific claims is supposed to proceed in a cumulative fashion, with the reigning theories of the day progressively approximating truth more accurately over time. In practice, however, cumulative self-correction tends to proceed less efficiently than one might naively suppose. Far from evaluating new evidence dispassionately and infallibly, individual scientists often cling stubbornly to prior findings. Here we explore the dynamics of scientific self-correction at an individual rather than collective level. In thirteen written statements, researchers from diverse branches of psychology share why and how they have lost confidence in a published finding. We qualitatively characterize these disclosures and explore their implications. A cross-disciplinary survey suggests that such loss-of-confidence sentiments are surprisingly common among members of the broader scientific population, yet rarely become part of the public record. We argue that removing barriers to self-correction at the individual level is imperative if the scientific community as a whole is to achieve the ideal of efficient self-correction.

The present research investigates semantic priming with an adapted version of the word fragment completion task. In this task, which we refer to as the speeded word fragment completion task, participants need to complete words such as lett_ce (lettuce), from which one letter was omitted, as quickly as possible. This paradigm has some interesting qualities in comparison with the traditionally used lexical decision task. That is, it requires no pseudowords, it is more engaging for participants, and most importantly, it allows for a more fine-grained investigation of semantic activation. In two studies, we found that words were completed faster when the preceding trial comprised a semantically related fragment such as tom_to (tomato) than when it comprised an unrelated fragment such as guit_r (guitar). A third experiment involved a lexical decision task, to compare both paradigms. The results showed that the magnitude of the priming effect was similar, but item-level priming effects were inconsistent over tasks. Crucially, the speeded word fragment completion task obtained strong priming effects for highly frequent, central words, such as work, money, and warm, whereas the lexical decision task did not. In a final experiment featuring only short, highly frequent words, the lexical decision task failed to find a priming effect, whereas the fragment completion task did obtain a robust effect. Taken together, these results suggest that the speeded word fragment completion task may prove a viable alternative for examining semantic priming.

No abstract

People have been shown to link particular sounds with particular shapes. For instance, the round-sounding nonword bouba tends to be associated with curved shapes, whereas the sharp-sounding nonword kiki is deemed to be related to angular shapes. People’s tendency to associate sounds and shapes has been observed across different languages. In the present study, we reexamined the claim by Hung, Styles, and Hsieh (2017) that such sound–shape mappings can occur before an individual becomes aware of the visual stimuli. More precisely, we replicated their first experiment, in which congruent and incongruent stimuli (e.g., bouba presented in a round shape or an angular shape, respectively) were rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. The results showed that congruent combinations, on average, broke suppression faster than incongruent combinations, thus providing converging evidence for Hung and colleagues’ assertions. Collectively, these findings now provide a solid basis from which to explore the boundary conditions of the effect.